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During the 1960s the United States military worked hard to interdict the movement of men and materiel along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Decidedly lacking in the ability to accurately strike at night or in adverse weather, the United States Air Force decided to initiate a crash development project in 1966: Operation Shed Light. The North Vietnamese were experts in the use of weather and darkness to conceal their movement, and understanding the superiority of American air power put their skills immediately to good use. US forces seeking to impede the steady flow of supplies attempted to locate largely static targets during the day with poor results. The United States Air Force, focused toward nuclear weapons and delivery of such munitions against static strategic targets had spent little effort in expanding its tactical capabilities since the end of the World War II. Operation Shed Light sought to rectify this by bringing together improved tactics and technology. The programs were subsequently centered on improved communication and navigation aids for all-weather and night flying, sensor equipment for seeing through clouds, foliage, and darkness, improved equipment and methods for target marking and battlefield illumination, and aircraft and tactics to utilize these developments. In the end, few of the programs would yield applicable results and most of the aircraft developed under its umbrella would largely fall into obscurity. The most applicable developments were those that could be mainstreamed such as the work done on navigation and communication and sensor equipment. ==Origins== The United States Air Force had largely redirected its efforts to the matter of strategic deterrence in the period between the Korean War and deployment to southeast Asia. As a result, it had few serious capabilities for the plethora of conventional missions that became readily apparent with the expanding US commitment to southeast Asia.〔Schlight, 1988. p. 227〕 Dedicated attack aircraft were virtually nonexistent, with the exception of the Korean War era A-1 Skyraider. The US Navy was still using the type at the time, and the US Air Force had itself been long interested in the type, with this further reinforced as a result of its advisory role in South Vietnam.〔Baugher, Joseph F. ''American Military Aircraft.'' 18 October 2001. (Service of AD Skyraider with US Air Force ). Access Date: 17 October 2007〕 The US supported Vietnam Air Force was in fact using it as their primary aircraft by 1965.〔Mesko, 1987. p. 38〕 These aircraft had directly replaced aging F8F Bearcats in 1962 and the decision was made in 1964 to transition to the type from the then standard T-28 Trojans.〔Mesko, 1987. p. 26-8〕 As a result of the orientation toward nuclear war, tactical air strikes were flown almost exclusively by the US Air Force between 1964 and 1966 using a variety of fighter bombers intended initially for the delivery of small strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. These types included the F-100 Super Sabre, F-4 Phantom II, and even the F-104 Starfighter. The F-100 had two fighter bomber variants in service at the time, the F-100C and F-100D, both of which were capable of carrying a nuclear store, and only the latter of which was primarily for use as a strike aircraft and not a fighter. The F-100C had largely been passed to the United States Air National Guard and by 1965 less than two hundred of the aircraft were capable of using cluster bombs or even the largely standard AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile.〔Knaack, 1986. p. 121-2〕 The F-104C, a fighter bomber version of another fighter, though capable of utilizing conventional air-to-ground stores, was intended as a nuclear weapon delivery platform.〔Knaack, 1986. p. 182〕 Only the F-4C and F-4D were available as a true multirole aircraft, and the F-4C had still been used firstly as a fighter when deployed to the theater.〔Knaack, 1986. p. 266〕 The only other major non-fighter type in use early on in the conflict was the B-57 Canberra. Strikes in Laos were even conducted for a time using the F-102 Delta Dagger, modified with infrared sensors, and using its internal rocket armament. These strikes proved largely fruitless and were quickly discontinued.〔Pfau and Greenhalgh, 1978. p. 4〕 Realizing the need for more dedicated attack aircraft the Air Force combed its inventory and looked to invest in new types. It found itself with an odd selection of obsolete, new, and experimental aircraft, and grasped for immediate solutions. To try and coordinate this effort, a task force was established by Lt. General James Ferguson, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. Dubbed Operation Shed Light, it began on 7 February 1966 as a means of coordinating a wide variety of technological and other projects and programs that were being pursued in order to improve the United States Air Force’s night fighting capabilities. Outlined in the Task Force’s charter as of April were the following: # Identify current equipment, techniques, and procedures being used by the USAF in Southeast Asia. # Identify planned modifications and new equipment being developed for Southeast Asia. # Survey exploratory, advanced development, and operational support projects having a potential application to the problem, indicating current programs or schedules. # Identify voids in our capabilities or efforts. # Recommend courses of action to improve and/or provide new attack capability in 1966, 1967, and the longer term.〔United States, ''Volume I Operation Shed Light Study Report'', 1966. p. 1A-7〕 In all, the Shed Light Task Force identified nine new weapon systems and seventy-seven research and development “tasks” in the first five months of operation.〔Pfau and Greenhalgh, 1978. p. 7〕 Over the next 5–10 years it hoped to have a fully functional "self-contained night attack aircraft," a single type that would meet the operational need and would be functionally useful in other similar situations. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operation Shed Light」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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